The Question o f Modernity A question that is worth a m om ent o f reflection: why does raising the issue of realism as a central problem in art (or literature) invariably require a certain gesture of withdrawal, for us to place it in brackets, or quotes? As if we were uncertain what we had in m ind when w riting this word, as if we did not know w hat it meant, or were opposing its standard, com m on-sense m eaning. Therefore, when Hilde van Gelder and Jan Baetens open their 2006 anthology of texts devoted to CriticalRealism in Contemporary Art with the words "20th-Century art [...] is at odds w ith realism, at least with the term," it is this final phrase that seem s key. The authors' thesis is that after the adventures of modernism, the avant-garde and postmodernism, realism returned in contemporary artistic practices. It returned as a result o f the exhaustion M ich ael Fried, Four H onest Outlaws: Sa la , Ray, Marioni, Gordon The suggestion that is made here is clear: that the painter-realist is somebody who strives for a certain automatism, as if he were h im self a machine. In the same way, photography, as it is inhuman, can only record reality, but not interpret it. As a mechanical, automatic thing (and thus working on its own) it is a representative of the destructive forces of modernisation: progress and industry.6 Baudelaire sees a gulf emerging between a "perfect" and "true" reproduction of reality, between the world recorded automatically (the world without humans) and that which permeates through the "filter" of imagination. And this is why I would suggest that the question of realism is a truly modern one: this gulf, or divide, is the point at which the place of hu mans in the modern world, their limits, and the conditions of understanding their constitution, become problematic. (There is no such thing as an objective record per se, even in photography). This is also why, in asking about realism, we must realise that problems are likely to ensure when answering the ques tion of what this "reality" to be presented is. Or what remaining faithful to it in the gesture of representation should mean. Owing to this diagnosis, when tackling the question of realism we usually make it clear that what is at stake is not simply creating a faithful copy of reality.
In the light o f this, it is hard even to state that there is such a thing as realism in general, and that if only we take a careful look at well selected exam ples we w ill be able to extract its secret. The question o f the modern condition was examined in the context of realism not only in the 19th century, but also -and perhaps above all -in the 20th: on the one hand within the classical avant-garde movement in Europe, from the time of facturalism up to productivism and factography under the banner o f Sergei Tretyakov and Alexander Rodchenko, and on the other as part of the "social realism" of West ern Europe and the United States, German "new objectivity" [Neue Sachlichkeit] and the M exican muralists.7 A ll these phenomena are like prisms in which "realism" lights up in an extravaganza of various aspects, topics and localities. 5 B au d elaire, "The Sa lo n o f 18 5 9 ," in Baudelaire. Selected Writings, 307. T h e sp a c in g o f th e last s e n te n c e is m in e (K. P.).
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T h e se is su e s are d isc u s s e d v e r y w ell by B en jam in B uch loh ; s e e his "From Faktura to F a c to g ra phy," October 30 (1984, A u tum n ): 10 2 -10 6 ; s e e a lso S a ra h W ilson, "'La B e a u te R evolution n aire'? They also suggest that it is to a large extent a phenomenon associated with a certain form of involvement in the shape of the social world around us, with some force of (practical) politicality. I shall be less interested in the immediate relationship between the image and the social reality in which it came about, and more in the philosophical aspect of realism as a problem of representation and as a certain politics of the image as such. What, then, are the stakes of "realism "?
Courbet and Absorption It will come as no surprise that I begin my argument from the aforementioned Gustave Courbet, who introduced the concept o f realism to thinking about art once and for all. (Though he claimed that "the title of Realist was thrust upon me,"8 this was the banner under which he held his rebellious individual exhibition at the World Exhibition in 1855). I shall base my analysis of Courbet's gesture on Michael Fried's interpretations. Fried, known above all as the arch-modernist l96os art critic and historian on the art of modernity, is the author of three extensive studies of "realism," whose subjects are, respectively, the Am erican painter Thomas Eakins (regrettably little-known in Europe), Courbet, and perhaps the most important, the German painter of the second h alf o f the l9th century, A d olf M enzel.9 Fried too begins his reflections by distancing him self from the premise of the "mim eticity" of realism:
Indeed it's hard not to feel that realist paintings such as Courbet's or Eakins have been looked at less intensively than other kinds of pictures, precisely because their imagined casual dependence on reality -a sort of ontological illusionism -has made close scrutiny of what they offer to be seen to be beside the point.10
Fried describes his own approach as "strongly interpretive," and in his reading o f pictures endeavours to go beyond what is literally found in the scene of the representation. The French philosopher Jacques Ranciere is very convincing in his criticism of the modernist equation of "realism" with representability (mimesis based on similarity) in literature. He tries to show that: the so-called "realistic" novel was not the acme of "representational art" but the first break with it. By rejecting the representational hierarchy between high and low subjects, as well as the representational privilege of action over description and its forms of connection between the visible and the sayable, the realistic novel framed the forms of visibility that would make "abstract art" visible.11
The fact that Ranciere concentrates on literature in this statement is useful, insofar as it allows me to establish a certain analogy between Courbet's project of painting and the writing strategy of his contemporary Gustave Flau bert. More on that in a moment. The above passage also points to a certain danger related to this "freeing" of realism from the restraints of similarity. This is illustrated extremely well by the interpretation of Courbet's canvases made by Charles Rosen and Henri Zerner, who see the historical value of the creator of Realism12 in the fact that he devalued the subject matter and "insisted on the painted surface as no one had ever done before." 13 They contrast his paint ing, which was indeed distinguished by thick im pasti that sometimes form on the surface o f the canvas -shapeless, tonally almost indistinct, and yet remarkably tactile surfaces™ -with the illusory academic painting of Ernest Meissonier and Jean-Leon Gerome. These artists treated the picture as a window (in the style of Alberti) and thus strove to make its surface as transparent as possible. For Rosen and Zerner, the fact that the content of the painting in Courbet's work is always subordinate to his way of applying the paint makes him a model representative of the "autonomy of art," which ultimately, in the 11 Ja c q u e s R anciere, "From P olitics to A e sth e tic s ? ," Paragraph 28, 1 (2008) : 20. T h e re is no sp a c e h ere to b ear o u t th e c o m p a riso n o f R an ciere w ith Fried, a g a in st w h o m -or m o re p recise ly a g a in st his re flec tio n on c o n te m p o ra ry a rtistic p h o to g ra p h y -th e p h ilo so p h e r w ro te on at le a s t on e o c c a sio n (se e R an ciere, "N o te s on th e P h o to g ra p h ic Im ag e," Rad ica l Philosophy 156 12 C o u rb e t in siste d t h a t "h is" realism be s p e lt w ith a c a p ita l letter. 14 For e x a m p le , T im o th y J. C lark n o te s h o w in B u ria la t O rnans C o u rb e t "le t th e m a s s o f con g eal into a solid w all o f black p ig m e n t, a g a in st w h ic h th e fa c e o f th e m a y o r's d a u g h te r and th e h a n d k erch ie f w h ic h c o v e rs his s is te r Z o e 's fa c e re g iste r a s te n u o u s, a lm o s t tra g ic in terru ptio n s." T im o th y J. C lark, Im age o f the People. Gustave Courbet an d the 1848 Revolution (Berkele y -L o s A n g e le s: U n ive rsity o f C alifornia P re ss, 19 9 9), 82. 20th century, led to the foundation of abstract painting.15 In this sense, alongside Courbet, Manet and the impressionists also number among the realists.
Fried is decidedly opposed to this verdict, and although Rancieres statement appears analogous to that of Zerner and Rosen, he too would have to disagree with this interpretation. Above all, this is because they confuse the autonomy of aesthetic experience with the autonomy of art. In fact, their interpretation includes Courbet in the "canonical" teleology of Clement Greenbergs modernism, according to which "Manet s became the first Modernist pictures by virtue of the frankness with which they declared the flat surfaces on which they were painted,"i6 thus making Courbet de facto the first modernist. As we know from Greenberg, only a literal two-dim ensionality is the "guarantee o f paintings independence [i.e. autonomy] as an art."i7 For Ranciere, this point o f view is unacceptable, since the idea of the autonomy of aesthetic experience -unlike that of the autonomy of art -is not built on the premise that each art, searching solely for "the effects exclusive to itself," its "purity" as a medium, would "narrow its area o f competence, but at the same time [...] make its possession of that area all the more certain."™ The autonomy of aesthetic experience was not meant to introduce the now "homeless" art (alienated from religious and courtly ritual) to a field of new certainty, but was "taken as the principle of a new form of collective life, precisely because it was a place where the usual hierarchies which framed everyday life were withdrawn."™ It is in this sense that "the idea of pure literature and the idea of literature as the expression of a determined social life are two sides of the same coin."2°F ried's take on all this is som ewhat different, although it does not seem that his vision is irreconcilable with the above. He sees Courbet (together with Edouard Manet) as a figure who crowned the tradition, central to French painting, which he calls antitheatrical, a tradition stretching back to the m id -l8th century and first theorised by Denis Diderot. It was Diderot, the author o f Jacques the Fatalist and his Master, who framed the requirement for a picture to in some way "establish the metaphysical illusion that the beholder does not exist, that there is no one standing before the canvas."21 From then on, the aim o f the m ost im portant painters o f this tradition -from Greuze, via David to Gericault -was "closing the representation to the beholder, above all by depicting figures wholly engrossed or absorbed in actions or states of mind and who therefore were felt to be unaware of being beheld (as though that apparent unawareness, that perfect absorption of the figures in the world of the representation, were experienced as curtaining off or walling off the representation from the beholder)."22 Yet in the i840s and i850s, this strategy, which artists achieved using ever more dramatic m ethods,23 ceased to be effective. Contemporary beholders became more and more aware that the figures on these canvases were in fact not absorbed in w hat they were doing, but merely wanted to be seen as such -that they were acting (Millet was one who encountered such reactions from audiences and critics). Courbet was the last painter who managed to achieve an absorptive effect, before Manet opened a whole series of "modernist adventures" 24 in a way that radically acknowledged25 the fact that the image was exhibited to be viewed by an (anonymous) audience. The way that he accomplished this involved the all-but-corporeal merger on the part of the painter-identified now as the painting's first beholder, or painter-beholder-with the painting before b e y o n d ' k n o w le d g e , n ot in th e order, or a s a fe a t, o f c o g n itio n , b u t in th e call upon m e to exp re ss th e k n o w le d g e a t its c o re , to re co g n iz e w h a t I know , to d o so m e th in g in th e ligh t o f it, a p a rt fro m w h ic h th is k n o w le d g e re m a in s w ith o u t e x p re ssio n , h en c e p e rh a p s w ith o u t p osse ssio n ." (S ta n le y C avell, The Claim o f Reason: W ittgenstein, Skepticism , Morality, and Tragedy, (N ew Y o rk -O x fo rd : O xford U n ive rsity P re ss, 19 9 9), 428). A n d : "M y h arp in g on a c k n o w le d g m e n t is m e a n t to n e t w h a t is valid in th e n otion o f s e lf-re fe re n c e and in th e fa c t s o f s e lf-c o ns c io u s n e s s in m o d e rn a rt. T h e e x p licit fo rm o f an a c k n o w le d g e m e n t is 'I k n ow I [p rom ised; am w ith d ra w n ; let you dow n ] ...' B u t th a t is n ot th e on ly fo rm it ca n ta k e ; and it is n ot c le a r w h y this fo rm fu n c tio n s a s it d o e s . W e should n o t a s s u m e t h a t th e p oin t o f th e p erson al p ronoun h ere is to r e f e r to th e self, for an a c k n o w le d g m e n t is an a c t o f th e s e lf[. him, the painting being realized under his brush. At least with respect to that beholder (the painter-beholder) the painting would ideally escape beholding completely; there would be no one before it looking on because the beholder who had been there was now incorporated or disseminated in the work itself.26
Courbet did this in various ways. For instance, in his self-portraits from the l840s, the early period of his work, the presence of the artist on the canvas was guaranteed by the very subject, and further strengthened in various ways. These included a series of operations allegorising the process of paint ing these images (the returning m otif of the arrangement of the hands, right and left respectively, as if they were holding the brush and palette), placing the figure close to the surface of the canvas so that it almost questioned the ontological separation of painted and real space, and finally the presentation o f the figure in positions that m inim ised the sense o f confrontation betw een the subject o f the portrait and the beholder (which in this case was one and the same person, Courbet him self). The limits o f representation are also placed in doubt by showing the figure from behind. On the one hand, this represents Courbet's situation as a painter-beholder, and on the other it makes the project of a quasi-corporeal union with the pic ture easier (creating the im pression of looking over the figures' shoulders, as in the painting AfterDinner at Ornans, 18 48 -18 49 ). Allegories of painter's tools make their return as well -a shotgun, lance etc. as counterparts to the brush, other objects as counterparts to the palette and the positioning of the body corresponding to that of the painter during his work. The signatures are also significant. For example, the poses of the figures in The Stone Breakers (1849) not only allegorise the brush (hammer) and palette (basket filled w ith stones), but their arrangem ent also repeats the shape o f the artists' initials and signature in the bottom -right corner of the picture. One might say that, irrespective of how "realistic" his paintings are, intuitively they always stick stubbornly to the fact that they are a painted reality. This is not quite the same as stating that Courbet's painting testifies to the autonomy of art. In other words, we can say that Courbet did not strive for the autonomy of the picture (or declare the irrelevance of the subject matter), but to evoke a certain "experience of corporeality, mobilized around the act of painting, that sought to undo the very distinction betw een em bodied subject and 'objective' world."2? In the central group in ThePainter' sStudio (18 54 -1855), one of his most important canvases, we see how the artist literally blends in with the picture emerging under his brush. The most radical manifestations of this strategy are attempts to identify with wom en (examples being The Source from 1869 and Sleeping Spinner from 1853) and with still lifes -stones and dead animals (The Trout, 1873) .
In all this, we must discern an element of a certain rather fragile dialectic. The signature can be interpreted as an element both of uniting the painterbeholder with the picture and emphasizing the surface nature of representation (or its objectivity). And similarly, an aspect o f painting that holds the viewer's gaze and at the same time may be interpreted as taking part in the project of the painter-beholder being united with the picture is the materiality o f its surface. Although, as Fried admits, it is hard to pinpoint the exact relationship between the first beholder-painter and subsequent viewers -the audience -one thing remains certain: according to his interpretation, these image structures are a response to the fact of the existence of an audience in the modern sense -an anonymous group of recipients looking at paintings for their own pleasure. This dynamic is described well by Stanley Cavell, with whom Fried engaged in dialogue starting in the late 1960s: If modernism's quest for presentness arises with the growing autonomy of art (from religious and political and class service; from altars and halls and walls), then that quest is set by the increasing nakedness of exhibition as the condition for viewing a work of art. The object itself must account for the viewer's presenting of himself to it and for the artist's authorization of his right to such attendance.28
In this sense, I would understand the Friedian antitheatrical tradition as the reverse of the "autonomy of aesthetic experience" as seen by Ranciere, as its dialectical pendant. For the French philosopher, this autonomy involved a break from mimesis, which also meant that However, Ranciere does not take account the fact that in the modern era, art also has other functions: it is entertainment, i.e. a good that can be possessed, objectified, consumed. This fact made art an extremely frag ile thing, with the audience's desire, and its gaze, demanding a spectacle, proving a threat to it. And it is here that a space for thinking of Fried's project in political terms opens up. (This would be one of the ways that I understand the painters "hyperbolic desire to abolish beholding altogether" in the The Source30). Fried him self looks at this question from two perspectives: Foucaults reflection on surveillance and m odern visuality, and M arx's idea of non-alienated labour. In the former case, he has the following to say:
For example, the entire effort to defeat the theatrical that I have ascribed to the Diderotian tradition might be understood simultaneously as an attempt to imagine an escape from the coercive visuality of the disciplinary mechanisms whose origin Foucault traces back to the middle of the eighteenth century (the figures in the painting must appear to be acting fieely, as if in the absence of any beholder) and as a product of those mechanisms and thus a source of coercion in its own right (the demand that the figures be seen in these terms virtually dictating the limits of representability, besides being finally impossible to satisfy).31
The issue of Courbet's construction of an effect of embodied subjectivity in his paintings is analogous. Fried interprets Courbet's ability to engage his own body in the production of his paintings to such an extent as an arch-example o f the phenomenon that Foucault called practices o f resistance. Courbet's strategy of quasi-corporeal unification also places in doubt, or forces us to reconsider, the dominant understanding of nature and reality as opposing humans, something from which we must keep our distance in order to acquire knowledge.
A s for M arx, w hat Courbet w as in a sense striving for in his paintings w as that "the production and the consum ption [...] exactly coincided" 32 (meaning that, by painting him self onto his canvases, he was not only their creator, but also their first beholder, and thus the consumer, excluding, or at least pushing further away, any others; he "aspired to leave no world outside the painting"33). This aspect of his work can be linked w ith the idea of the perfect correspondence of production and consumption, in M arx designating nonalienated labour.3* O f course, in the m odern situation, nonalienated labour m ust rem ain a fantasy, and the idea of paying for "work being squandered," a representation o f which T. J. Clark sees in TheStone Cutters ("m en turned stiff and w ooden by routine"35), becom es a utopia, rather like the attempt to paint oneself into a picture, to become the same as the representation, closing it to the world and thus m aking it immune to appropriation. Yet this does not at all mean that being condemned to defeat is a chance characteristic of Courbet's project. On the contrary, argues Fried: "it was precisely the im possibility of literal or corporeal merger that made that project conceivable, or rather pursuable." 36 This radical instability of Courbet's position regarding his own work, suspended between absolute immanence and equally absolute externality, opens the possibility of looking at an analogy with the writing strategy of Flaubert, which I mentioned above. In Flaubert's letter to George Sand, we read: I expressed m yself badly when I said to you that "one should not write from the heart." I wanted to say: one should not put one's personality on stage. I believe that great art is scientific and impersonal. One should, by an effort of the spirit, transport oneself into the characters, not draw them to oneself. That is the method at least.37 Dominick LaCapra sees in this statement a fundamental tension in Flaubert's view o f the ideal relationship between the producer and the work: between "objective im personality and subjective identification," as if there existed a narrative strategy capable of abandoning the opposition between the objective and the subjective.38 In this radical disconnection of the position -suspended between the impersonal distance of science and the immanence of total identification -it is not hard to perceive a strong analogy to what can be experienced in the paintings of Gustave Courbet. It is tempting, furthermore, to link this division to the aforementioned problem of representation in the time of photography, suspended between automatic recording of the world and the immersion embodied in it. Fried examines the question of the relationship of Courbet's painting with photography, and indeed notes that his works consistently tackle the subject of automatism (though he does not write how exactly, we can assume that he is referring to the ease with which Courbet uses paint to produce similarities and analogies), while at the same time placing in doubt the absolute differentiation between automatism and the act of will. (One might say that in Courbet's practice there is no such thing as "pure" recording).
Fried's "strongly interpretative" strategy therefore has nothing anti-or apolitical about it. Like Clark, h e s not interested in interpreting political m essages based on the "contents" o f a painting (e.g. the non-hierarchical, inclusive composition in works such as Burial at Ornans as an expression of Courbet's democratism or egalitarianism), but in finding in works of art moments of "mediation." Clark writes:
I want to discover what concrete transactions are hidden behind the mechanical image of "reflection," to know how "background" becomes "foreground"; instead of analogy between form and content, to discover the network of real, complex relations between the two.39
This too is why Fried confesses that the degree to which his interpretation might seem convincing depends not on (establishing) a perfect correspondence between the picture and its artist, but on "an entire network of connections within Courbet's oeuvre," which link more seldomly the closer one gets to the edges.40 One might say that this refers to the whole field of politicality, the paintings as his territory; to the various ways in which we make contact with the world and inhabit it.
Menzel and the Vitality o f Objects In an extremely extensive and nuanced study of the work of Adolph Menzel, Fried examines the question of realism in a sim ilar w ay to that used earlier in the case o f Eakins and Courbet. Here too, a central aspect is M aurice M erleau-Pontys concept of the embodied subject and "living perception" that accompanied Fried as a necessary tool of thinking about aesthetic experience ever since his time as a modernist critic. (In this sense he questions the widely held opinion of the pure visuality of not only realism, but modernism as well.) As my reconstruction is no more than an outline, I w ill not be able to show the complexity of Fried's argument. Menzel is an extremely interesting and im portant figure particularly because of his singularity; one would struggle to find sim ilar figures in the Germ an-speaking world, and even more so to say that he was part of the anti-theatrical tradition traced by Fried. Yet it is Menzel who helps us to understand w h y Fried calls his selected "realists" "bodily painters,"41 since the work o f no other artist o f the tim e w as based to the same degree on "countless acts o f im aginative projection of bodily experience."42 Menzel did not feel the need to exclude his viewers from the painting, turning it into a separate, closed world; on the contrary, the beholder in the act of perceiving his works is forced to make analogous acts o f projection. Innumerable drawings by the Germ an artist (whose motto w as "nulla dies sine linea" -"no day w ithout a lin e") contain distinct indications o f the changing position o f the body and situation of perception while at work, e.g. the inscription of perceiving an object situated close by (almost from above, depicted in a sculpture-like manner) and a landscape (seen from a distance, rendered in a flat way) on one sheet in the drawing TheSchafgrabenFlooded (1842-1843); a mirror reversal of the im age in Partial Self-Portrait from 1876, not to mention the artist's remarkable ability to convey the m aterial and tactile nature o f an object, as w ith the books in the drawing DrPuhlmann' sBookcase (1844), or the planks in Cemetery among the Trees, with an Open Grave (1846-1847). He also frequently depicted the same object from various angles, almost as if he were turning it in his hands, as in the outstanding gouache Moltke's Binoculars (1871). We can also find examples of the changing perspective, pulling the viewer deep into the 1 6 o v i s u a l l i t e r a c y picture, in his larger oil works, portraying views from window s: Garden of PrinceAlbert' sPalace (1846/1876) and Rear CourtyardandHouse (1844), which Fried sees as one of the masterpieces of 19th-century painting.
Owing to the tactile nature of Menzel's painting, and the mobility of his points of view, one might feel tempted to suggest that he did not paint views, but rather created im ages from within his own (bodily) im m ersion in the world43 (which is also w hy his paintings invite us to look at them from up close). Fried tries to show that, in spite of his isolation, Menzel was not sus pended in a vacuum; after all, it was during his lifetime that the aesthetic of empathy (Einfuhlung) developed in Germany. According to Robert Vischer, Heinrich Wolfflin, August Schm arsow and others, empathy meant that our corporeality determines the forms of seeing the world; it is we that project our own image onto the reality that surrounds us; we are able to create and embody this image in inanimate matter, in still life. (This is an extremely abbreviated look at the matter, but so be it). The remarkable, smallish oil painting TheArtist'sFoot (1876) is probably the best example of this projection mechanism. This all leads to the conclusion that Menzel's art is essentially un-or even anti-photographic, since it does not seem that a photograph could produce such an effect of embodied reception44. It is worth adding that Fried him self would struggle to defend this statement, as in various photographs -especially the late landscapes of Stephen Shore45 -he recognised such possibilities of reception. Also very important to mention are Thomas Struth's Museum Photographs.116 Yet the effects have nothing to do with the "photographic" nature of these works, but rather with an appropriate construction of the picture and its scale attuned to the conditions of reception. 43 In fa c t o n e cou ld s a y th e s a m e th in g a b o u t C o u rb e t, a s d e m o n stra te d by tw o a n e c d o te s: th e first s to ry too k p la c e in su m m e r 18 4 9 du rin g C o u rb e t's s ta y w ith Fran cis W ey and C am ille C o ro t in L o u v e c ie n n e s. O n e d a y a fte r lunch, th e p ain te rs w e n t into th e fo re s t to p ain t, and C o ro t too k a lon g tim e find in g th e right p o i n t o f v i e w . C o u rb e t, on th e o th e r han d, p u t his e a se l a n y w h e re . "It d o e sn 't m a tte r w h e re I s e t up," he said , "It's a lw a y s g oo d a s lon g a s I have a v ie w o f n atu re." T h e s e c o n d in cid en t to o k p la c e in S w itz e rla n d , a ft e r C o u rb e t had g o n e into exile. O ne d a y his a s s is ta n t, P a ta, d re w his a tte n tio n to a fa v o u ra b le p oin t o f v ie w . 
" R E A L IS M ," E M B O D IE D S U B jE C TS , P R O jE C T IO N O f EM PATHY
1 6 1 Fried admits that there are certain kinds o f photographs that can trigger a strongly empathetic effect: pornographic pictures for one, and those depicting bodily wounds and deformations, i.e. medical or war photographs; a similar result can be found in snapshots of people unaware of being photographed (as discussed by Susan Sontag). Yet these are all situations in which this effect is achieved automatically, and are therefore not o f interest to Fried. According to him, the parallel development o f the new invention o f photography and Menzel's career m eans that they m ust be thought o f in terms of a strong, but antithetic relationship. Both photography and Menzel's realism are based on the exchange or transfer of traces, yet in the former case this exchange is literal or causal, whereas with Menzel it is only -albeit with exceptional power -suggested and empathically interpreted by the beholder:
More broadly, I see Menzel and nineteenth-century photography as practicing two antithetical forms of extreme realism, the second predicated on a technology of detachment, according to which the operator is at least relatively speaking mechanically removed or abstracted from the actual production of the image, the first based [...] on empathic projection, which is to say on the heightened imaginative/corporeal involvement of the embodied artist in every aspect of the making of the oil paint ing, gouache, or drawing. It is tempting to think of the first as a kind of antidote or counterforce to the second, but it would probably be truer, certainly it would be more historical, to say that both the very extremeness and the chiasmus-like inner relation of the two realisms bind them irrevocably together and in the end make each one less than fully intelligible except in the light of the other.w It is this juxtaposition and merging o f the two modes o f representation that interests me most. Does the way it is formulated not resound with that "fundamental tension" that we can find both in Flaubert and in Courbet? Fried maintains that "the effort of keying a drawn or a painted image to a body that is keyed to the world, neither relationship being one that can be taken for granted, is an exemplary modern effort."48 A n answer to the question about the exact meaning of this argument is given by the shift in Fried's narrative when he discusses Menzel's gouaches -from the aforementioned representa tion of the artist's foot, as well as two small images of his hand, one holding a container filled with paint and a the other a book (?) from the l86os, to the series o f remarkable depictions o f suits o f armour from the same periodmaking an uncanny analogy between them. The former evoke a sense of "inner vitality" in the viewer: the closer we look, the more we become aware of an articulated interplay of bones, muscles, tendons, veins, the skin itself traversed by capillaries, as if the painter were seeking to make actual to the viewer -to render accessible as bodily feeling -not just the physical effort of holding the paint dish and the book (?) but also, going beyond ordinary sensation, the flow of blood and nerve impulses to and from the hands and fingers.49
The im pression o f looking at armour is equally uncanny (and overflowing with vitality): the suits of armor (a kind of clothing, needless to say) are portrayed as at once inanimate and animate, empty yet instinct with life; more precisely, the artist wished to leave no doubt as to the absence within them of actual bodies [ . ] yet at the same time he has deployed and grouped the bodylike suits, cuirasses, helmets, and so on in postures and arrangements that impose themselves on the viewer as incipiently alive and potentially menacing.50 I hope that the above comparison, which demonstrates the extent to which Menzel was able to bestow a certain peculiar vitality, autonomous power and almost bodily being to animate and inanimate things, shall make Fried's next reference to the writings of M arx distinctly legible, as well as his suggestion about the modern character of the desire to do something like that. He cites a passage from Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts o f 1844, which refers to alienation:
Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is ours only when we have it [...] Therefore a l l the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the simple estrangement of a ll these senses, the sense of having. So that it might give birth to its in ner wealth, human nature had to be reduced to this absolute poverty.51 49 Ibid., 53-54. 
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In everyday, material industry ... we find ourselves confronted with the objectified powers of the human essence, in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects, in the form of estrangement.52
Interestingly, the former passage is used -twice -by Walter Benjamin in his Arcades Project. For him, there emerges from the text a "positive countertype to the collector -which also, insofar as it entails the liberation of things from the drudgery of being useful, represents the consummation of the collector." 53 In the case of Menzel it is even more -he gives them almost their own, autonomous life. Fried suggests that Menzel's pictorial practice produces just this counter-type of relations to things, not based on alienation, arguing that to an extent he realises Marx's "vision of the everyday world of manufactured things as saturated with vital feeling, his assumption, in Elaine Scarry's words, «that the made world is the human being's body» . " 54
Crary and Modern Subjectivity The above attempts to define the realisms of Courbet and Menzel in categories of practices resistance may still seem unconvincing or unclear, as I am yet to provide the most important reasons for such considerations. I speak of the reconfiguration of understanding of modern subjectivity, the "emergence of models of subjective vision in a wide range of disciplines during the period l8 l0 -l8 4 0 ,"55 which Jonathan Crary described in his groundbreaking study
Techniques o f the Observer (and to whose further fortunes he devoted his book Suspensions of Perception). This topic permits us to see the tension present in realism -between a distant ("automatic") record and identification, absorption -in a clearer light.
Crary calls this process the autonomisation of sight, which can be summed up in two points. The first aspect o f the new understanding of subjectivity is, as Iwona Kurz writes, the revival and embodiment of the subject, acknowledging sight as an active, dynamic practice, a process subject to human physiology, constituted in the "denseness and materiality" of the human body, yet also innate in its fragility and uncertainty, no longer able conform either to the sterile model in which images are formed like precise casts of reality, or to the objective scheme of the all-seeing Eye.56
Second, and more importantly in this context, this process also entails a separation ofthe senses, their gradual "purification." In the case of sight, it is especially important to separate it from the sense of touch, which had been an integral part of classical theories of vision in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The subsequent dissociation of touch from sight occurs within a pervasive "separation of the senses" and industrial remapping of the body in the nineteenth century. The loss of touch as a conceptual component of vision meant the unloosening of the eye from the network of referentiality incarnated in tactility and its subjective relation to perceived space. This autonomization of sight, occurring in many different domains, was a historical condition for the rebuilding of an observer fitted for the tasks of "spectacular" consumption.57
A ccording to Crary, the d iscovery o f the em bodim ent o f the subject opened two paths. The first o f these led to the affirm ation o f the sovereignty of sight in m odernism , and the second to the standardisation and regulation o f the observer, and thus form s o f power dependent on the abstraction o f seeing. A ccording to this very critical understanding, the appearance o f m odernism , and w ith it the society o f the spectacle, were linked to the suppressing of the embodied aspect of visual perception. It is not hard to gather that the role played by photography in this process w as considerable.
In this context, realism as understood by Fried becomes one of the main tools of resistance to the autonomisation of the senses, one whose existence -if we deem Fried's interpretation to be convincing -w as not perceived by Crary. The latter put forward the alternative between the reduction of 
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1 6 5 experience in the universalist aspirations of modernism and its enslavement in the visual regime of the modern society of the spectacle.58
If we are to believe Fried, then, his examples seem to suggest that there are several ways in which this non-illusory "transgression" can take place. Firstly, thanks to a strategy based on a kind of visual violence that involves blinding, that is to say on showing something the sight of which seems painful, seems to threaten the gaze, and indirectly also the looking subject. (This is both the simplest and the most difficult strategy; the most difficult because a "produc tive" blinding seems to be no small feat). The second strategy entails engaging the viewer corporeally in the picture -in various ways, but never directly, and above all not exclusively through the sense of sight. The third would be the allegorical principle, i.e. when we make things that appear obvious form complex webs of connections and analogies.
For me, the m ost interesting "realistic" works are those which sim ply (though o f course there is nothing simple to it) test sight as the privileged sense of access to the world -they seek to transgress the inevitable flatness and objectivity of representation, to create a "stage," where in the least theatrical and thus most "natural" way possible (whatever that might mean) its ob ject can manifest itself in such a way, as if it became the object of our examination by itself. (We thus return to the idea of a world without humans).
Gordon and Empathetic Projection
To conclude, please allow me a short diversion to open this analysis to the present day. In his book Four Honest Outlaws, M ichael Fried exam ines four contemporary artists: the video artist and filmmaker A nri Sala, the sculp tor Charles Ray, the painter Joseph M arioni and another creator o f moving pictures, Douglas Gordon. According to Fried, at least three o f Gordon's works -Play Dead; Real Time (2003 ), B-Movie (1995 ) and ioms-i (1994 , and one of Sala's -TimeAfter Time (2003) -raise the question of embodied experience as a contemporary one, albeit shifting the emphasis somewhat. Play Deada video installation composed of two screens suspended in the gallery space and one video monitor -is paradigmatic here. On the two screens we see a female elephant (named Minnie) who "plays dead" in an unspecific, vast, clean room, from time to time struggling up off the concrete floor. To do this, she has to go through a whole set of laborious tasks: getting her huge, lumbering body swinging, putting her front legs on the floor (as Fried rightly notes, from close up they look like a costume, as if the elephant were not real, but played by a person), before finally standing on all four legs. All this time, the camera moves at a slow, steady tempo around Minnie -on one screen clockwise, and on the other counterclockwise. (This relationship is reversed if we go to the other side of the screens). A t the same time, the elephant is framed in such a way that we never see her in full -it is always a framed part of her body that we are watching. The monitor shows a series of close-ups of the animal's eye. The effect o f the whole is such that the viewer empathetically projects her own "unavoidably anthropomorphising feelings" on (the moving image of) Minnie, or, in the case of B-Movie, on a fly lying on its back and defencelessly kicking its legs.59 This arouses ambivalent feelings over the appropriateness of the elephant performing these laborious "exercises" for our "amusement" (the title of the work suggests an imperative, that Minnie is doing this all on command). On the one hand we have a monstrous and unshapely being in comparison with the human body, which, it would seem, makes it impossible to identify with the animal. On the other hand, though, the beast's awkwardness, the strange "artificiality" of her appearance, and especially the close-up of her eye, seeming to express some "subjectivity" after all, initiate a fundamental mental mechanism that Stanley Cavell called "empathic projection," which according to him constitutes "the ultimate basis for knowing of your existence as a human being." 60 Where, Cavell asks, does the assumption that a person must recognise someone else as a human being come from?
From some such fact as that my identification of you as a human being is not merely an identification o f you but with you. This is something more than merely seeing you. Call it empathic projection.61
According to Fried, the works of Gordon and Sala, referring to the "absorptive tradition" stretching back to the work o f Caravaggio -and thus to the tendency to create images o f beings who are entirely absorbed in their activities, to the extent that they seem to exclude the presence of the beholder at the scene o f the representation -lay bare62, and thus make problematic, 
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1 6 7 the empathically projective mechanism on which this tradition was based.63 It is this suggestion that the question o f empathy (or rather o f the viewer projecting his empathy) was from the very beginning key to the traditions of absorptive portrayal that is a measure of their importance as works of art.64 Problematizing the issue of empathic projection brings with it the question of the limits of this empathy: what or whom found opposite us will we be able to call a "being," or even a "person"? What do we consider "natural," and what "artificial"? Where does "performance" end or begin? Is it at all possible for the object of (or in) a representation to appear to us a s such?
What we have called realism here essentially describes an attempt to aban don -even for a moment, never more than for a moment -the status of rep resentation as a screen separating us from the world, to project such a way of access to the image that w ill allow us to touch something more than just reality's dummy, to transgress the level of knowledge towards (corporeal) ex perience. To be sure, there is no metaphysics, no epiphany involved here -no ecstatic unification of the subject with the world, (Courbet knew better than anyone that this is impossible) but rather a certain way of harmonising with its matter, a sharper, more sensitive mode of an everyday form of attention. Can such an aspiration of an image be called a "politics of realism "?
Translation: Benjamin Koschalka w h a t th e m o d e rn th ro w s ov er -to n ality, p e rs p e c tiv e , n arration , th e a b s e n t fo u rth w all, e t c . -w a s so m e th in g in e sse n tial to m u sic, p ain tin g, p o e try , and th e a tre in e arlier p erio d s. T h ese w o u ld be fa lse s u g g e stio n s. For it is n o t th a t n o w w e fin ally k n ow th e tru e co n d itio n o f art; it is on ly th a t s o m e o n e w h o d o e s n ot q u e stio n th a t con d ition h as n oth in g, or n ot th e e sse n tia l th in g , to g o on in a d d re s s in g th e a rt o f ou r p eriod. And fa r from im p lyin g th a t w e n o w know, fo r e x a m p le , th a t m u sic d o e s n ot require ton ality, nor p ain tin g fig u ra tio n nor t h e a tre an audie n c e o f s p e c ta t o r s , e tc ., e x a c tly w h a t I w a n t to h ave a c co m p lish e d is to m a k e all su c h notion s p ro b le m a tic [...] ." S ta n le y C avell, "A M a tte r o f M ea n in g It," in M ust We M ean What We S a y? (C am b rid g e: C a m bridge U n ive rsity P re ss, 19 76 ), 220.
